

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2527

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PROIRITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0120

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY MR. KARPOV (ACTING CHIEF OF SOVDEL)

AND GENERAL BELETSKY, APRIL 2, 1975 (SALT TWO-589)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY MR. KARPOV
(ACTING CHIEF OF SOVIET DELEGATION) AND GENERAL BELETSKY,
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 2, 1975.

KARPOV STATEMENT , APRIL 2, 1975

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING, THE NEW
AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985
WILL PROVIDE FOR ESTABLISHING AGGREGATE LIMITS, EQUAL FOR
BOTH SIDES, ON THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES
(2,400 UNITS), AND ALSO ON THE NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND
LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE
INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES (1,320 UNITS).

NATURALLY, IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE NEW AGREE-
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MENT A QUESTION WILL ARISE CONCERNING THE PROCEDURE FOR BRING-
ING THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES POSSESSED

BY THE SIDES INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED LIMITATIONS, SHOULD THEIR NUMBERS TURN OUT TO BE IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS ESTABLISHED.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE, AND THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE XI OF THE USSR DRAFT, THAT PROVISIONS ON THIS SCORE MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, ADHERES TO A SIMILAR APPROACH, AS SHOWN BY THE WORDING OF ARTICLE IX OF THE U.S. DRAFT.

AT PRESENT THE SIDES HAVE CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROBLEM UNDER CONSIDERATION AS IT APPLIED TO THE AGREEMENTS IN FORCE. THIS EXPERIENCE IS EMBODIED IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972, AND IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND FOR ABM SYSTEMS, SIGNED JULY 3, 1974.

THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, IN VIEW OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE TASK BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS OF PREPARING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TEXT FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, TAKE THIS POSITIVE EXPERIENCE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

THE ARTICLE STATES THAT STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST BE PUT INTO A CONDITION WHICH PRECLUDES THEIR OPERATIONAL USE. THIS IS A PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE GOAL TOWARD WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT ARTICLE MUST BE DIRECTED.

INCLUSION OF THIS PROVISION IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT POLITICALLY, SINCE IT WOULD EXPRESS IN CLEAR FORM THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THAT AGREEMENT ARE AIMED AT ACTUAL AND EFFECTIVE LIMITATION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE

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SIDES.

WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE, THE SIDES HAVE ALREADY REACHED A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THE PROTOCOL IN PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH, IN PARTICULAR, STATES THAT THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROVIDED FOR SHALL ENSURE THAT THE CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS ARE PUT IN A CONDITION THAT PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR USE FOR

LAUNCHING ICBMS OR SLBMS.

THE MEANING OF THE WORDING OF ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT COINCIDES WITH SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. MOREOVER, IT IS NATURALLY MORE GENERALIZED.

THIS ARTICLE OF THE SOVIET DRAFT FURTHER PROVIDES THAT PUTTING STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN A CONDITION WHICH PRECLUDES THEIR OPERATIONAL USE SHALL BE BY DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION. THIS IS ALSO IN ACCORD WITH THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES, ACHIEVED WITH RESPECT TO THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH ARE IN FORCE. WE NOTE THAT ARTICLE IX OF THE U.S. DRAFT IN ESSENCE CONTAINS A COINCIDING FORMULATION ON THIS QUESTION.

ON THE BASIS OF THE PRACTICE OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS IN FORCE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT, AS STATED IN ARTICLE XI OF THE USSR DRAFT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF THESE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROCEDURES. THIS PROVISION, TOO, VERY CLOSELY CORRESPONDS TO THE WORDING CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE U.S. DRAFT.

THE NUMBERS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SIDES WOULD, UNDER ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, BE BROUGHT INTO LINE WITH THE AGGREGATE MAXIMUM LEVELS PROVIDED FOR WITHIN AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS MUST BE SPECIFICALLY AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT DISMANTLING AND
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DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED LIMITATIONS REQUIRES QUITE SPECIFIC PERIODS OF TIME, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT PURSUANT TO THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL OCTOBER 1977.

AS FOR THE SPECIFIC DURATION OF THE PERIOD FOR DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, IT FOLLOWS FROM THE TEXT OF ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT THAT IT IS SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THIS PROVISION OF ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TAKES REALISTIC ACCOUNT OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SIDES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CORRESPONDING AGREEMENTS NOW IN FORCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN THE U.S., RELATED TO THE LIMITATIONS UNDER THE ABM TREATY, AS YOU KNOW, WERE NOT COMPLETED BY THE U.S. SIDE,

UNTIL MAY 1974. IN ORTHER WORDS, IT TOOK TIME TO PERFORM THE
NECESSARY WORK TO BRING THE ACTUAL STATE OF THINGS TO
CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.

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MR. AMBASSADOR,

THUS, THE PROPOSED SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED WOULD BE
OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF ENHANCING THE VIABILITY
OF THE AGREED LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN
ALL THEIR TOTALITY.

ON THE BASIS OF A COMPARISON OF THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE XI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AND ARTICLE IX OF THE U.S.
DRART, THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE ISSUES DEALT
WITH IN THESE ARTICLES COULD BE DISCUSSED IN A WORKING GROUP
WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT AD REFERENDUM TO DELEGATIONS AGREED
JOINT FORMULATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE TEXT BEING PREPARED
FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

BELETSKY STATMENT, APRIL 2, 1975

THE U.S. SIDE, IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT IT
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TABLED, AND ALSO IN STATEMENTS ON FEBRUARY 10 AND 21, AND
MARCH 7 AND 12, 1975, USED A NEW TERM--"NON -HEAVY" ICBMS.

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SHOWN EARLIER THAT THE USE OF
THIS TERM FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IS UNWARRANTED.

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH SOME ADDITIONAL CON-
SIDERATIONS ON THIS QUESTION.

FIRST OF ALL, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USE OF
THIS NEW TERM IS IN CLEAR CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISION
RECORDED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
OF MAY 26, 1972 WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT.

AS YOU KNOW, ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
CONTAINS THE TERMS "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY " ICBMS. DURING THE
CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
HAS BEEN IN EFFECT, NO AMBIGUITIES OF ANY KIND HAVE EMERGED
IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH TERMS. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II
OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAVE THUS CONFIRMED THEIR VIABILITY.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE AGREED DECISION TO CARRY
OVER ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT INTO THE NEW AGREE-
MENT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUAL STATUS OF THE STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN
THIS CONNECTION REFERENCES TO SOME SORT OF CHARACTER-
ISTICS OF SOVIET ICBMS, TO WHICH ARE LINKED ATTEMPTS
TO REPLACE THE TERM "LIGHT" BY THE TERM "NON-HEAVY",
AS ALREADY POINTED OUT BY THE USSR DELEGATION, ARE
UNFOUNDED.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE ADDED THAT THE VERY TERM "NON-
HEAVY" AS APPLIED TO ICBMS IS AMBIGUOUS AND DIFFUSE,
AND CAN BE INADEQUATELY INTERPRETED. THEREFORE, REPLACE-
MENT OF THE PRECISE AND CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE TERM
"LIGHT" BY THE VAGUE TERM "NON-HEAVY", FOR COMPARISON WITH
THE TERM "HEAVY", IS NOT JUSTIFIED.

THE QUESTION ALSO ARISES: FOR WHAT PURPOSE ARE
SUBSTANTIVELY NEW APPROACHES ADVANCED WITH RESPECT TO THOSE
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PROVISIONS WHICH WERE FULLY SETTLED A MERE TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS? IT WOULD SEEM THAT PUTTING FORWARD SUCH CONCEPTS, BASED ON BIASED CONSIDERATIONS AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS ADOPTED, IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE MATTER OF "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" MISSILES HAS BEEN FULLY RESOLVED BY SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON THEIR LAUNCHERS, AS STIPULATED IN THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH ARE TO BE CARRIED OVER INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT. ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION OF THIS UNDERSTANDING IS UNFOUNDED.
JOHNSON

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